In the maritime tradition, there is an old saying: “The captain goes down with the ship”, suggesting that, in the event of an emergency at sea, it is the captain who bears the ultimate responsibility to save the ship and those on board or die trying.
This metaphor is used in this article to offer a balanced assessment of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s reformist ambitions and political shortcomings during his tenure as president of the African National Congress (ANC).
Ramaphosa was elected at the ANC’s 54th National Conference in 2017 to become president in what many observers characterised as a significant moment in South Africa’s political history.
Just a year before his presidency, in 2016, discussions about state capture emerged across social media and mainstream platforms. “The Capture of the State” became the focal point of debate in South Africa’s political arena.
During this period, public trust in the ANC government was declining sharply, with negative consequences for the country’s economic, social and political institutions.
Likewise, the ANC found itself deeply embroiled in factional battles that signalled organisational decline, fragmented the tripartite alliance and contributed to the loss of major metropolitan municipalities across the country.
While some observers position Ramaphosa as a president who inherited an organisation damaged by the actions of his predecessors and attempted to repair institutional harm, one cannot ignore that his presidency coincided with political fragmentation, governance failure and the accelerated electoral decline of the ANC.
At the beginning of his presidency, Ramaphosa entered office as a “renewal figure”, promising to restore credibility to both the state and the party. His promise was the “New Dawn”, which he introduced in 2018 as an era of the rule of law, institutional renewal and transparency. Many observers embraced this vision. The country experienced a period of optimism as many viewed him as an anti-corruption and ethical leader.
He also became a favourite among international observers and the business community, who placed their hopes on economic recovery and the restoration of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the South African Revenue Service (Sars) and parts of the judiciary.
To some extent, investor confidence improved initially and some argue that sections of the state stabilised under his leadership after a decade of institutional erosion.
Despite the prevailing perception that he was a corrective figure, expectations may have exceeded the ANC’s actual capacity for self-reform.
Turning to state capture and the limitations of the ANC’s internal renewal, perhaps the greatest contradiction in Ramaphosa’s leadership was his attempt to reform the party through some of the same internal networks implicated in its decline. The findings of the Zondo commission, spanning more than 5 000 pages, were deeply damaging to the ANC, exposing extensive entanglement in corruption.
At the same time, commentators and opposition parties criticised the slow pace of accountability within the ANC. The step-aside rule — an internal policy requiring members charged with corruption to recuse themselves voluntarily from party and government responsibilities — created significant tensions.
Factional resistance emerged, while those accused of violating the rule frequently argued that it had been weaponised for political purposes.
Failure to decisively isolate corruption networks weakened Ramaphosa’s reform credentials and governance energy was consumed by internal battles. Rather than acting decisively when required, he often appeared cautious.
Critics argued that he prioritised party unity over organisational renewal. His supporters, however, contended that he lacked sufficient internal support to act more aggressively. Regardless, the ANC increasingly appeared divided, morally compromised and incapable of self-correction.
Although Ramaphosa was presented as the ideal candidate to rebuild the economy, his tenure has been characterised by persistent unemployment, with youth unemployment at 59.93%, slow economic growth, the energy crisis, rising living costs and the continuing struggle to reduce inequality and poverty.
Additional pressures included the economic fallout from Covid-19, the July 2021 unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng and deteriorating infrastructure and municipal collapse.
Although some crises were global in nature and beyond his control, South African voters increasingly judge governments by outcomes rather than inherited conditions. As socio-economic frustration intensified, the ANC’s liberation legitimacy weakened.
A more recent controversy is the Phala Phala scandal, which appears to have damaged Ramaphosa’s reputation as an anti-corruption reformer.
Despite his claims of innocence, events surrounding the incident on his farm contributed to perceptions of secrecy. The scandal also provided opposition parties with a powerful political tool ahead of elections and blurred the distinction between Ramaphosa and previous ANC leadership controversies.
As such, the scandal, the Constitutional Court judgment referring the report to the impeachment committee and Ramaphosa’s decision to seek a review of the report may have weakened the moral authority of the “New Dawn”.
It should be noted, however, that no criminal conviction has emerged from the scandal. Politically, however, perception can outweigh legal outcomes, particularly during election periods.
Consequently, these events have made it more difficult for the ANC to present itself as an organisation rooted in the values on which it was founded.
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that Ramaphosa will not save the ANC and may instead be presiding over a sinking ship. Under his leadership, the party suffered its most significant electoral setback since 1994.
In several municipalities, the ANC either failed to secure a majority or failed to regain those lost in 2016, including Tshwane, Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela Bay.
There are few indications that the party’s fortunes will improve in the 2026 elections, particularly as revelations from the Madlanga Commission and other controversies continue to emerge.
Although some scholars argue that coalition government was inevitable because of the design of South Africa’s constitutional and electoral systems, Ramaphosa’s presidency appears to have accelerated that transition. At national level, the ANC suffered a major setback when it lost its electoral majority and witnessed the rise of the MK Party under former president Jacob Zuma.
The ANC increasingly appears unable to maintain ideological cohesion and electoral support.
Internal divisions that were once concealed are now visible to the public. As factional tensions intensify, the party continues to lose support among younger voters who have no emotional connection to its liberation history.
Although it is fair to note that Ramaphosa did not create all the conditions by which he is judged, it was during his presidency that the ANC’s electoral decline became undeniable.
In the final analysis, one question remains: Can Ramaphosa rescue the ANC or will history judge him as the captain who led the party into South Africa’s political dustbin?
His legacy is likely to remain contested — reformist to some and indecisive to others. The ANC’s crisis extends beyond any one individual.
It reflects a long history of patronage politics, structural governance challenges and the erosion of the liberation movement’s moral legitimacy in democratic South Africa.
Siyanda Kate is a political sciences lecturer at the Walter Sisulu University and political studies PhD candidate at the Nelson Mandela University.
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that Ramaphosa will not save the ANC and may instead be presiding over a sinking ship. Under his leadership, the party suffered its most significant electoral setback since 1994
