The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not necessarily those of Breaking Belize News.
By Dorian A. Barrow, Ph.D.
Florida State University
For all intents and purposes, Belize is a Western country. Not only is it geographically located in the Western Hemisphere, but its political institutions, cultural practices, dominant languages, and economic alignments are unmistakably Western. English is our official language, our legal system is derived from British common law, and our economy is intrinsically embedded in the Western economic order. The Belize dollar is pegged to the United States dollar at a fixed rate of two to one, and the United States remains our major trading partner, cultural reference point, and geopolitical anchor. These realities are so deeply ingrained that they are often treated as irrefragable facts of national life.
Yet to acknowledge Belize’s Western orientation is not to deny the presence or importance of investments from other regions of the world. Saudi Arabia has invested in Belize primarily through loans targeting infrastructure development. Nigeria has contributed through the deployment of technical professionals in health, economics, and history, enriching local capacity and expertise. Taiwan has long been a visible and significant partner, particularly in agriculture, rural development, and technical cooperation. These relationships are generally transparent, publicly discussed, and widely understood.
What has generated quieter conversation—sometimes bordering on rumor, sometimes grounded in observation—is the expanding footprint of Chinese assets in Belize. Unlike other partners, China is often described as the “silent partner,” present but not always loudly announced. Chinese involvement appears most visible in communication technologies, wholesale and retail merchandising, and food distribution. The word on the street is that if Chinese-owned or Chinese-supplied stores were to close for even a week, many Belizeans would struggle to meet basic food needs. Whether this claim is exaggerated or not, its persistence suggests a deeper unease that deserves careful examination rather than dismissal.
Take telecommunications as an example. Belize Telemedia Limited (BTL) reportedly uses Huawei-brand switches in its communication systems, as does the other major telecom provider in the country. On a purely technical level, this may be a rational decision: Huawei equipment is often cost-effective, reliable, and technologically advanced. However, in a global context of escalating tensions between China and the United States, such choices take on geopolitical significance far beyond their immediate economic rationale. For a small state like Belize, deeply tied to the U.S. economy and financial system, these decisions are not ineluctable in their consequences, even if they appear unavoidable in the short term.
For me then, the central questions are not whether Chinese assets exist in Belize—they clearly do—but rather: What is the total value of these assets? In which sectors are they concentrated? How much of this investment is state-owned, state-linked, or privately controlled? And, most importantly, how should Belize proceed given the rapidly shifting global balance of power? These are not questions of paranoia but of prudence.
One danger in public discourse is catachresis: the misuse or overstretching of terms in ways that confuse rather than clarify. To speak of “Chinese control” of Belize, for instance, may be an exaggeration that obscures more than it reveals. At the same time, to dismiss all concerns as xenophobic or uninformed would be equally irresponsible. The truth likely lies somewhere in between, and it requires sober analysis rather than emotionally charged rhetoric.
From a Point perspective, one could argue that Chinese assets in Belize represent a form of economic diversification that reduces overdependence on traditional Western partners. In an increasingly multipolar world, it may be strategically wise for Belize to engage with multiple economic actors. Chinese businesses provide affordable goods, create employment, and improve access to technology and infrastructure. In this view, concern over Chinese involvement may reflect outdated Cold War thinking rather than contemporary economic realities.
The Counter Point, however, raises legitimate issues of dependency, transparency, and strategic vulnerability. When critical infrastructure such as telecommunications relies heavily on technology from a single foreign source—particularly one entangled in great-power rivalry—the risks multiply. What happens if sanctions, trade restrictions, or diplomatic pressure force Belize to choose sides? What if supply chains are disrupted due to geopolitical conflict? These are not hypothetical questions; they are scenarios already playing out in other parts of the world.
Moreover, the structure of ownership matters. State-owned or state-linked assets carry different implications than purely private investments. If a significant portion of Chinese assets in Belize is tied directly or indirectly to the Chinese state, then economic engagement cannot be neatly separated from political influence. This does not imply malign intent, but it does require awareness and policy foresight.
In conversations with friends and colleagues, I have encountered a range of views—some alarmist, others dismissive, many uncertain. What strikes me is a shared sense that Belize lacks a comprehensive, publicly accessible assessment of foreign assets across the board, not just those associated with China. Without such data, public debate becomes contumacious, marked by stubborn assertions on all sides but little movement toward consensus or clarity.
Moving forward, Belize would benefit from a transparent audit or mapping of major foreign-owned or foreign-linked assets, particularly in strategic sectors such as telecommunications, energy, food distribution, and finance. This is not about singling out China but about strengthening national capacity to make informed decisions. Such an exercise would adumbrate the contours of Belize’s economic dependencies and opportunities, allowing policymakers and citizens alike to engage the issue with evidence rather than speculation.
Ultimately, the question “Should we be concerned?” does not lend itself to a simple yes or no. Concern, in this context, should not mean fear but attentiveness. Belize’s Western orientation is unlikely to change, but the world around us is changing rapidly. Navigating this landscape requires balance: welcoming investment while safeguarding sovereignty, embracing opportunity while managing risk.
Chinese assets in Belize are neither an existential threat nor a trivial footnote. They are part of a broader global realignment that small states cannot afford to ignore. The challenge before us is to ensure that engagement is strategic, transparent, and aligned with our long-term national interests. That, surely, is a concern worth having—and a conversation worth deepening.
Feel free to challenge any or all of the claims made in this piece above and let us remain engaged in this geopolitical conversation about our country’s alignment and long term national interests.
The post Point and Counterpoint~ Chinese Assets in Belize: Should we be concerned? appeared first on Belize News and Opinion on www.breakingbelizenews.com.
The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not necessarily those of Breaking Belize News. By Dorian A. Barrow, Ph.D. Florida State University For all intents and purposes, Belize is a Western country. Not only is it geographically located in the Western Hemisphere, but its political institutions, cultural practices, dominant languages,
The post Point and Counterpoint~ Chinese Assets in Belize: Should we be concerned? appeared first on Belize News and Opinion on www.breakingbelizenews.com.
