The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not necessarily those of Breaking Belize News.
By Dorian A. Barrow, Ph.D.
Florida State University
This piece was inspired by a discussion that two radio personalities had recently on the future of CARICOM and Belize’s own security posture in light of the pending matters that Belize and Guatemala have at the ICJ, and the US heightened presence in the Caribbean. As we all know, Belize’s long and often uneasy relationship with Guatemala has deep historical roots, stretching back to the colonial era when Belize was known as British Honduras. In my research on this topic, one concept that frequently appears—sometimes accurately, sometimes to me, loosely—in discussions about this history is the Monroe Doctrine. Proclaimed by the United States in 1823, the doctrine warned European powers against further colonization or interference in the Americas. But what relevance did this U.S. policy really have to Belize, then a British colony surrounded by newly independent Spanish-speaking republics, and to Guatemala’s long-standing territorial claim? I found that 0pinions differ sharply, making this an ideal subject for a Point and Counter Point examination.
The Point: The Monroe Doctrine as a Shield for British Honduras
From one perspective in the literature reviewed, the Monroe Doctrine indirectly benefited British Honduras and helped shape the regional balance that allowed Belize to emerge as an independent state. Supporters of this view argue that while the doctrine did not apply neatly to existing European colonies, it created a political climate that discouraged aggressive expansion and conquest in the Western Hemisphere.
By the early 19th century, Britain already had a foothold in the settlement that became British Honduras, primarily for logging and trade. Guatemala, newly independent from Spain in 1821, later claimed the territory as part of its inheritance from the Spanish Empire. However, Guatemala was never in a strong position to enforce that claim militarily, especially as Britain formalized its control and declared British Honduras a colony in 1862.
The Monroe Doctrine signaled that the United States considered itself the dominant external power in the Americas. Even though Britain was an exception – seen more as a partner than a rival—the doctrine discouraged new European adventures and reinforced the idea that territorial disputes should be settled through diplomacy rather than conquest. In this context, Guatemala’s options were limited. Any attempt to forcibly seize British Honduras risked destabilizing the region and drawing in larger powers.
In the 20th century, especially during the Cold War, U.S. influence in Central America grew stronger. Some Belizeans argued that U.S. adherence, even if selective, to the Monroe Doctrine helped deter Guatemala from military action during the tense years leading up to Belize’s independence in 1981. The presence of British troops on Belizean soil, combined with diplomatic pressure from the United States and the wider international community, contributed to the survival of Belize’s territorial integrity.
From this point of view, the Monroe Doctrine, while not written for Belize, formed part of a broader geopolitical environment that favored stability and ultimately allowed us Belizeans to determine our own future.
The Counter Point: A Doctrine That Did Not Protect Belize
Critics, however, argue that invoking the Monroe Doctrine in Belize’s history gives it too much credit and masks the reality of power politics. They point out that the doctrine was primarily designed to protect U.S. interests, not small colonies or future nations like Belize.
First, the Monroe Doctrine explicitly tolerated existing European colonies. British Honduras fell squarely into that category. The United States did not challenge Britain’s presence in Belize, nor did it actively defend the colony against Guatemala’s claim. For much of the 19th century, the dispute between Britain and Guatemala was treated as a bilateral issue, resulting in agreements such as the 1859 Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty—an agreement whose interpretation remains controversial to this day.
Second, critics note that the United States has often applied the Monroe Doctrine selectively. In Central America and the Caribbean, U.S. interventions were frequent but usually motivated by strategic or economic interests rather than principles of sovereignty or justice. Belize, small and economically marginal they argue, did not command the same attention as countries with canals, large markets, or strategic military value.
During the critical decades before independence, Belize’s security depended far more on British military presence and international diplomacy than on any abstract doctrine from Washington. It was Britain’s commitment to defend the colony, combined with Belize’s successful campaign at the United Nations, that countered Guatemala’s claim. Many Belizeans remember that independence came not because of U.S. guarantees, but despite regional pressures and lingering uncertainty.
From this counter point, it seems like the Monroe Doctrine is at best a background idea and at worst a distraction. Belize’s survival and sovereignty, critics argue, were achieved through Belizean resilience, British obligations, and multilateral support—not through a U.S. policy that was never meant to protect a British colony, even though they ended up not objecting to Belize’s independence in ‘81.
Where Belize Stands Today
For me, the debate over the Monroe Doctrine is not just academic. It shapes how Belizeans understand their history and assess the role of powerful nations in regional affairs. Today, Belize and Guatemala are pursuing resolution of their territorial dispute through the International Court of Justice, a process grounded in international law rather than gunboat diplomacy or 19th-century doctrines.
For me, this modern approach suggests a clear lesson: small states benefit most from rules-based systems, not from reliance on the shifting priorities of great powers. Whether one views the Monroe Doctrine as a protective umbrella or an irrelevant slogan, Belize’s experience shows the limits of doctrines when confronted with complex colonial legacies and national aspirations.
Conclusion
This brief analysis suggests that In weighing the point and counter point, it becomes clear that the Monroe Doctrine occupies an ambiguous place in Belizean history. It neither doomed nor decisively saved British Honduras. Instead, it formed part of a wider geopolitical backdrop against which Belizeans, along with allies like T&T and institutions, struggled for recognition and security. For me, understanding this nuance allows us Belizeans to appreciate their past without mythmaking—and to face the future with eyes open to both the promises and limits of international power.
Feel free to challenge any or all of the claims made in this piece, and let’s continue the public discourse on CARICOM and our regional security.
The post Point and Counterpoint~ Belize (British Honduras), Guatemala and the Manroe Doctrine appeared first on Belize News and Opinion on www.breakingbelizenews.com.
The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not necessarily those of Breaking Belize News. By Dorian A. Barrow, Ph.D. Florida State University This piece was inspired by a discussion that two radio personalities had recently on the future of CARICOM and Belize’s own security posture in light of the pending
The post Point and Counterpoint~ Belize (British Honduras), Guatemala and the Manroe Doctrine appeared first on Belize News and Opinion on www.breakingbelizenews.com.