The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not necessarily those of Breaking Belize News.
Who elected the Social Partners?
When Advocacy Becomes a Claim to Power
By Lennox Lamb: The social partners were right to challenge the proposed BTL acquisition of Speednet.
They were right to question the valuation, the secrecy surrounding the transaction and the possibility of returning Belize to a telecommunications monopoly. They were right to demand that Cabinet listen before allowing a major national asset to undertake an eighty-million-dollar acquisition.
Cabinet listened. The deal was rejected.
That should have been celebrated as a victory for public participation and democratic accountability. But before the ink on Cabinet’s decision could properly dry, the campaign shifted.
Suddenly, this was no longer only about stopping one controversial transaction. It became an opportunity to demand a permanent share of governing power.
At the August 18 press conference, the unions and social partners called for the immediate removal of BTL Chairman Markhelm Lizarraga and the review or removal of other directors. They demanded a tripartite BTL board involving government, labour and business. They proposed restructuring the Public Utilities Commission so that organized social partners would nominate a majority of its commissioners. They demanded scheduled meetings with the Prime Minister, quarterly government accountability reports and a policy directing one hundred percent of government telecommunications business to BTL.
Hold on.
That is no longer simply civil-society oversight.
That is an attempt to convert successful advocacy into permanent governing authority.
Who Elected the Social Partners?
Let me be crystal clear: this is not a defence of the government, BTL’s chairman or any political party.
I am a firm supporter of people’s power. But people’s power must mean the power of the Belizean people—not merely the power of the best-organized groups claiming to speak for them.
In a democracy, national governing authority ultimately comes from the people through elections. Unions, business organizations, churches and NGOs have important roles. They should scrutinize government, represent their members, propose reforms, expose wrongdoing and mobilize public opinion.
But they are not the electorate.
Their leaders are selected through their own memberships and internal processes. The ordinary Belizean who does not belong to an affiliated union, chamber, evangelical organization or registered NGO has no vote in choosing them.
So before these organizations begin dividing up seats on public boards and regulatory commissions, Belizeans are entitled to ask one blunt question:
Who elected them to govern the country?
These organizations already possess important constitutionally recognized channels of influence through Belize’s social-partner representation in the Senate. That limited constitutional role does not automatically give them the right to control public regulators, determine the composition of corporate boards or establish privileged access to the Office of the Prime Minister.
The elected government should not control every institution. We have seen enough political appointments and institutional interference to understand that danger.
But replacing political appointees with permanent union, business or social-partner appointees is not automatically reform. As we say in Belize, that may amount to nothing more than changing monkey for black dog.
The names and organizations may change, but the fundamental problem remains: a small group of people, not elected by the general public, controlling institutions that belong to the entire country.
We cannot condemn political capture while creating a new system of institutional capture. That would not return power to the people. It would simply transfer power from one organized group to another—while the Belizean public remains outside looking in.
A Public Regulator Must Be Independent of Everyone
The present system for appointing the PUC is vulnerable to political influence. That deserves reform.
But allowing organized social partners to nominate four of seven commissioners would not necessarily produce independence. It would give those organizations majority influence over the regulator.
Let us call it what it is.
They are not only asking for the PUC to become independent of the government. They are asking for the PUC to become dependent on them.
These groups represent important sections of Belize, but they do not represent the entire Belizean population. No organization should be allowed to quietly transform its sectional mandate into a national mandate.
A genuinely independent PUC should be built through publicly advertised vacancies, professional qualifications, transparent selection, strict conflict-of-interest rules, staggered terms and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny.
Civil society should be allowed to recommend qualified candidates. But no collection of organizations should be guaranteed permanent control of a national regulator.
A regulator must be independent of government, political parties, corporations, unions and advocacy groups alike.
Otherwise, we are not eliminating institutional capture. We are merely changing who gets to do the capturing.
The Monopoly Contradiction
The most glaring contradiction is the demand that one hundred percent of government telecommunications business be directed to BTL.
The social partners opposed the acquisition partly because BTL had already been declared dominant across major telecommunications markets and because absorbing Smart could damage competition.
Yet, after defending competition, they turned around and demanded an exclusive government-procurement policy for BTL.
How does that make sense?
If monopoly power is dangerous when BTL attempts to purchase a competitor, it does not suddenly become harmless when BTL is guaranteed every government telecommunications contract.
You cannot preach competition on Monday and demand exclusivity on Tuesday.
BTL is a strategic national asset, and the government may reasonably consider it when procuring essential services. But public contracts should be governed by transparent policy, price, performance, national security and public value—not by a “non-negotiable” demand from any pressure group.
Good governance cannot mean competition when competition supports your argument and exclusivity when exclusivity benefits your constituency.
That is not a principle. That is convenience.
Oversight or a Parallel Government?
Regular consultation with unions, businesses, churches and NGOs is healthy. Government should listen to organized civil society.
But guaranteed meetings with the Prime Minister, named public officers reporting on government commitments and permanent seats across public institutions begin to resemble something more than consultation.
It begins to resemble a parallel government—one that was never placed before the Belizean electorate.
And that raises another question:
Who will monitor the monitors?
Before any organization receives a statutory right to nominate regulators or govern national assets, Belizeans should know whom it represents, how its leaders are chosen, how it is funded, what conflicts of interest exist and how the public can hold it accountable.
Government must disclose its interests. Political parties must disclose theirs. Social partners seeking permanent public authority should be held to the same standard.
Accountability cannot be a one-way street where social organizations demand complete transparency from the government while their own internal finances, selection systems and competing interests remain beyond public examination.
Based on the evidence presently available, I would not call what is happening blackmail. But I will call it what it appears to be: pressure politics and institutional opportunism—a legitimate public victory being used to pursue a broader transfer of influence.
The social partners helped stop a questionable transaction. They deserve credit for that.
But stopping the government from exercising power irresponsibly does not entitle the organizations that led the opposition to inherit that power.
Democracy cannot be a bus that we ride when it takes us where we want to go, then abandon when we believe we can reach the destination faster by taking control of the steering wheel.
Belize does not need unchecked government control. But neither does Belize need an unelected council of permanent stakeholders operating beside the elected government and dividing national institutions among themselves.
We need institutions strong enough to restrain whoever occupies Belmopan. We need regulators independent enough to withstand political, commercial and organizational pressure. Most importantly, we need accountability that belongs to the Belizean people—not merely to the most organized groups speaking in their name.
The social partners were right to demand that the government know its limits.
Now they must be reminded of theirs.
The post Who elected the Social Partners? appeared first on Belize News and Opinion on www.breakingbelizenews.com.
The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not necessarily those of Breaking Belize News. Who elected the Social Partners? When Advocacy Becomes a Claim to Power By Lennox Lamb: The social partners were right to challenge the proposed BTL acquisition of Speednet. They were right to question the valuation, the
The post Who elected the Social Partners? appeared first on Belize News and Opinion on www.breakingbelizenews.com.
